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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recognition of the reality of wrongful conviction, a number 
of jurisdictions have developed post-conviction review1 schemes 
aimed at addressing such mistakes. Our aim in this Article is to 
address the question of how such schemes should ideally operate. 
Although a range of examples of post-conviction review will be 
discussed, we do so primarily by a comparative study of the post-
conviction review schemes in Scotland, Canada, and North 
Carolina. Scotland and North Carolina are two of a very limited 
number of jurisdictions that have established independent 
criminal case review commissions, although the scope of the 
respective commissions are very different.2 Canada retains a 
system whereby claims of wrongful conviction are adjudicated by 
a government minister, assisted by an advisory body.3  
To date, analysis tends to focus on particular post-conviction 
review schemes in isolation. By bringing together, for the first 
time, the accumulated experience of these three jurisdictions (and 
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 1. By post-conviction review, we mean the system for conviction review that takes 
place outside the normal criminal appeals process—usually (but not always) after the 
appeals process has been exhausted. 
 2. See infra Part IV(B) (Scottish commission); Part IV(C) (North Carolina commission).  
 3. See infra Part IV(A) (Canada’s Criminal Conviction Review Commission).  
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other examples where appropriate), we argue that there is a clear 
case for the existence of an independent body to undertake post-
conviction review. Such a body, we argue, should not restrict its 
remit to cases in which fresh evidence emerges, but should be 
empowered to refer cases where there has been a procedural 
impropriety that casts doubt on guilt. Such a body should not, 
however, be permitted to refer cases where there is overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, despite the seriousness of the procedural breach 
concerned. We then go on to argue that, in principle, there are no 
good reasons for restricting the ambit of post-conviction review to 
serious cases or to cases where the applicant is living (although 
political or resource constraints might serve as practical 
considerations here). Finally, we argue that a post-conviction 
review body charged with the review of individual cases is not in 
the best position to engage in law-reform work aimed at preventing 
wrongful conviction at a systemic level. Doing so might 
compromise its relationship with the courts and would require a 
membership different to that best suited to the review of individual 
cases. 
II. THE NEED FOR POST-CONVICTION REVIEW 
It has long been recognized that there is a need for some sort 
of procedure by which convictions can be reviewed outside of the 
normal criminal appeals process. A number of notorious examples 
where factually innocent individuals have initially failed to 
overturn their convictions on appeal demonstrate that the criminal 
courts do not always get it right the first—or even second—time.4 
There is also ample evidence, stemming primarily from DNA 
exoneration projects in the U.S.,5 that conviction of the factually 
 
 4. To take an example from Canada, David Milgaard was wrongly convicted for the 
murder of Gail Miller in 1970. His initial appeal against conviction was unsuccessful and 
he served almost 23 years in prison until he was freed in 1992 and later fully exonerated 
through DNA forensic analysis in 1997. See Sarah Harland-Logan, David Milgaard, 
INNOCENCE CAN., https://www.aidwyc.org/ 
cases/historical/david-milgaard/ (last visited July 9, 2017) (detailing the case of David 
Milgaard). 
 5. See Innocence Project 25 Year Anniversary, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://25years 
.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited July 9, 2017) (focusing on exonerations that used 
science); see also The National Registry of Exonerations, LAW.UMICH.EDU, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited July 9, 
2017) (providing detailed information on every known exoneration in the U.S. since 1989). 
The Innocence Project was founded in 1992 based at Cardozo Law School. At the time of 
writing (February 2017), the Innocence Project listed 348 exonerations. The NRE is part of 
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innocent is a real and pressing problem. As a result of this 
evidence, we can state with certainty that wrongful conviction does 
occur, and we can even confidently identify the main causes.6 
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Article, we also 
know that in many cases that have subsequently been shown to be 
instances of wrongful conviction, an initial appeal against 
conviction was unsuccessful.7 This recognition has led some 
jurisdictions to establish criminal case review commissions—
independent bodies which can review convictions and in 
appropriate cases refer them back to the courts for reconsideration. 
The first and best known of these is the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland,8 
 
the University of Michigan Law School and has a slightly wider remit compared to the 
Innocence Project. At the time of writing, 1,976 exonerations were listed. For a detailed 
analysis of the Innocence Project’s first 250 DNA exonerations, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5–6 (2011). For 
analysis of the NRE exonerations, see SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, 
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS 2–4 (2012), available at https://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf. 
 6. There is a remarkable consensus that the main evidential causes of wrongful 
conviction are mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, misleading forensic 
evidence and the evidence of accomplices or informers (or others who have a motivation to 
lie). GARRETT, supra note 5, at 165–67; Gross & Shaffer, supra note 5, at 40. Other 
environmental and psychological factors also play a role, such as a culture of incentivizing 
guilty pleas and the psychological phenomenon of tunnel vision that can affect those 
investigating and prosecuting cases. GARRETT, supra note 5, at 150–53, 165–70, 265–68; 
Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System, 31 MAN. 
L.J. 403, 436–37 (2006). There is a vast amount of literature devoted to identifying 
safeguards that might be put in place to combat some of these factors. See, e.g., Keith A. 
Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary Rules in 
the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2013) (looking into the rules of evidence and 
its connection to wrongful convictions); Lisa D. Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable 
Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 261, 263–64 (2008) (suggesting a new and improved evidentiary rule to prevent 
wrongful convictions); Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. 
Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo & Allison D. Redlich, Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors 
and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010) (using psychological science to 
prevent wrongful convictions); Fiona Leverick, Jury Instructions on Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: A Re-Evaluation, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 555, 555–56 (2016) 
(safeguarding wrongful convictions through proper jury instructions); Richard A. Wise, 
Kirsten A. Dauphinaise & Martin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 808 (2007) (attempting to provide a solution to errors related 
to faulty eyewitness testimonies as they related to wrongful convictions). 
 7. See GARRETT, supra note 5, ch. 7 (discussing the long appeals and post-conviction 
processes). 
 8. The establishment of the Commission was recommended by the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice. ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUSTICE, REPORT 182 (1993). This 
Commission will subsequently be referred to as “the English CCRC” to distinguish it from 
its Scottish counterpart. Within the overall jurisdiction of the United Kingdom of Great 
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which was established in 1997 following a series of notorious 
miscarriages of justice, mostly relating to terrorist cases.9 Other 
jurisdictions followed, with independent criminal case review 
commissions also being set up in Scotland, Norway, and North 
Carolina.10 For the sake of completeness, the DNA Review Panel 
should also be mentioned—which operated in the Australian 
jurisdiction of New South Wales between 2007 and 2014—an 
independent body that had the power to refer cases to the appeals 
court but was disbanded after making no referrals.11 Other 
jurisdictions—such as Canada and Australia—retain a variation 
of the system that existed prior to the establishment of the English 
CCRC whereby post-conviction review is in the hands of a 
government minister.12 
The existence of these different forms of post-conviction review 
raises a number of questions about the proper scope of such bodies. 
We address these questions by examining three schemes for post-
conviction review in more detail—those of Scotland, Canada, and 
North Carolina. These jurisdictions were chosen because they offer 
a range of approaches to the issues concerned.13  
 
Britain and Northern Ireland, there are three separate and distinct legal systems—those of 
Scotland; England and Wales; and Northern Ireland. 
 9. See John Weeden, The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, 58 CRIM. L.Q. 191, 191–94 (2012) (providing a detailed account 
of the so-called “Birmingham 6” and “Guildford 4”). 
 10. The Scottish and North Carolina Commissions are discussed in detail later in this 
Article. For discussion of the Norwegian Commission, see Ulf Stridbeck & Svein 
Magnussen, Prevention of Wrongful Convictions: Norwegian Legal Safeguards and the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2012); Ulf Stridbeck & Svein 
Magnussen, Opening Potentially Wrongful Convictions: Look to Norway, 58 CRIM. L.Q. 267 
(2012). 
 11. David Hamer, Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need 
for a Criminal Cases Review Commission, 37 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 270, 292–95 (2014); 
Lynne Weathered, Reviewing the New South Wales DNA Review Panel: Considerations for 
Australia, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 449, 450–52 (2013). 
 12. Canada is discussed in detail later in this Article. For discussion of the Australian 
system, see Bibi Sangha & Robert Moles, Mercy or Right: Post-Appeal Petitions in Australia, 
14 FLINDERS L.J. 293 (2012); Lynne Weathered, Pardon Me: Current Avenues for the 
Correction of Wrongful Conviction in Australia, 17 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 203 
(2005). 
 13. In this Article, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission is selected for 
detailed analysis over its more well-known counterpart, the English CCRC, on the basis 
that it has not yet been the subject of academic discussion to the same extent as the English 
CCRC. This is despite the fact that the SCCRC has been favorably compared to the English 
CCRC in terms of the greater resources it has at its disposal and the wider powers it has to 
obtain evidence. See, e.g., Peter Duff, Straddling Two Worlds: Reflections of a Retired 
Criminal Cases Review Commissioner, 72 MOD. L. REV. 693, 694 (2009) (comparing the 
English CCRC and the SCCRC in detail) [hereinafter Straddling Two Worlds]; Lissa 
Griffin, International Perspectives on Correcting Wrongful Convictions: The Scottish 
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Of course, the schemes have to be seen in the wider legal and 
political context of the jurisdiction in question. However, 
examination of their accumulated experience does generate a 
number of important insights about the appropriate role of a post-
conviction review body in relation to claims of innocence and the 
implications this has for the contours of review schemes. Before 
proceeding to discuss the three schemes, however, it is necessary 
to consider the meaning of innocence and how this affects 
eligibility for exoneration. 
III. THE MEANING OF INNOCENCE 
The ultimate aim of a post-conviction review body is to offer a 
remedy to those who are innocent of the crime of which they have 
been convicted, but that raises the question of precisely what is 
meant by innocence. While there is considerable confusion over 
terminology,14 a useful distinction can be made between legal and 
factual innocence.15 Broadly speaking, factual innocence refers to 
the conviction of someone who did not commit the crime in 
question, either because it was perpetrated by someone else or 
because no crime was ever committed.16 Legal innocence refers to 
the conviction of someone who should not, under the rules of the 
legal system in question, have been convicted.17 While legal 
 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1153, 1212 (2013) 
(praising the works of the SCCRC). For detailed analysis of the English CCRC, see LAURIE 
ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE? TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMMISSION (2008); CLIVE WALKER & KATHRYN CAMPBELL, The CCRC As an Option for 
Canada: Forwards or Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR 
THE INNOCENT? ch. 14 (Michael Naughton ed., 2012) (discussing the English CCRC as an 
optional model for Canada); Weeden, supra note 9, at 1419–23; David Kyle, Correcting 
Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 52 DRAKE L. 
REV. 657 (2004). 
 14. For differing perspectives, see e.g., Cathleen Burnett, Constructions of Innocence, 70 
UMKC L. REV. 971, 973–74 (2002); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 
1157, 1159–60 (2010); Steven Greer, Miscarriages of Justice Reconsidered, 57 MOD. L. REV. 
58, 66 (1994). 
 15. Although within these two broad categories there are many subtle distinctions, it 
lies beyond the scope of the Article to discuss these. But see MICHAEL NAUGHTON, THE 
INNOCENT AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, 16–17 (2013) (providing more detailed categorizations); CLIVE 
WALKER, Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, in MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 31–37 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1999) (showing 
different categorizations of miscarriages of justice). 
 16. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 45 (1987). 
 17. Id. at 45. 
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innocence might incorporate cases of factual innocence, it would 
also encompass those who are (or may be) factually guilty but 
should not have been convicted because there was a procedural 
irregularity during the process that led to conviction.18 
The term miscarriage of justice is sometimes used to describe 
the conviction of a factually-innocent person, but it is also the legal 
test for appeal against conviction in some jurisdictions.19 In other 
words, it has a legal meaning (which normally encompasses 
convictions where there has been a procedural irregularity as well 
as those where fresh evidence casts doubt on guilt), but that legal 
meaning does not necessarily correspond with the way it is 
understood outside the narrow confines of the law.20 
It should also be said that factual innocence is something that 
is often very difficult to establish conclusively. The increased 
sophistication of DNA testing has meant that there now exists a 
growing number of cases—especially in the U.S.—in which it can 
be said with absolute certainty that a factually innocent person has 
been wrongly convicted.21 In cases where no physical evidence 
exists, however, the extent to which factually innocent people have 
been wrongly convicted is impossible to determine.22 The extent to 
which post-conviction review bodies should confine themselves to 
cases of factual innocence and the difficulties that arise in defining 
and identifying this are considered later in the Article,23 which now 
turns to a brief account of the post-conviction review schemes in 
Canada, Scotland, and North Carolina. 
 
 18. There are many types of procedural irregularities that might justify quashing a 
conviction, such as trial judge misdirection, jury misconduct, or evidence admitted that was 
obtained via an irregular procedure. A procedural irregularity may or may not cast doubt 
on the guilt of the accused. See infra notes 155–76 and accompanying text (discussing the 
factors that play into a wrongful conviction). 
 19. See infra p. 11 and accompanying text (specifying the different usage of the term 
miscarriage of justice—Scotland being an example of such jurisdiction). 
 20. See, e.g., Sion Jenkins, Miscarriages of Justice and the Discourse of Innocence: 
Perspectives from Appellants, Campaigners, Journalists, and Legal Practitioners, 40 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 329, 329–30 (2013) (explaining the different usage and meaning of “innocence”). 
 21. See supra note 5 (finding examples of such cases as uncovered by the Innocence 
Project and the NRE). 
 22. Zalman has established a generally accepted “[e]stimate” of wrongful convictions in 
the U.S. of between 0.5% and 1% for felony convictions, but the extent to which these figures 
translate to other contexts and jurisdictions is an open question. Marvin Zalman, 
Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221, 230 
(2012). 
 23. See infra notes 138–52 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences and 
drawbacks of different systems that confine themselves to factual innocence). 
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IV. THE POST-CONVICTION REVIEW SCHEMES 
A. The Criminal Conviction Review Group (Canada) 
In Canada, ministerial review is the primary remedy for those 
who believe their conviction is erroneous following an exhaustion 
of the appeals process.24 The provisions for ministerial review are 
found in Part XI.1 of the Criminal Code.25 The right to review a 
conviction was first introduced into law in 1923.26 After many years 
of ad hoc review, the Criminal Conviction Review Group (CCRG) 
was formed in 1993. The CCRG was comprised of a group of 
lawyers within the Department of Justice who reported directly to 
the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice.27 In 2002, the conviction 
review process was again amended legislatively, in part due to 
dissatisfaction with procedural delays, secrecy, and lack of 
accountability.28 Changes included, inter alia, clearer criteria 
regarding remedies, increased investigative powers, movement to 
a physically separate building from the Department of Justice, and 
the appointment of a Special Advisor.29 While some of these 
changes were made in response to criticisms that the CCRG should 
more closely resemble the independent English CCRC,30 they did 
not result in any major shift in the way that the CCRG operates. 
As it stands today, ministerial review is available for 
convictions for both indictable and summary offenses.31 Applicants 
must have exhausted all avenues of appeal, at the provincial 
 
 24. It is also possible to appeal to the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, but such appeals have 
waned since the abolition of the death penalty in Canada in 1976. The Royal Prerogative is 
not discussed in detail here, but see Gary T. Trotter, Justice, Politics and the Royal 
Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the Self-Defence Review, 26 QUEEN’S L.J. 339 (2001). 
 25. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 696.1–696.3.  
 26. Patricia Braiden & Joan Brockman, Remedying Wrongful Convictions Through 
Applications to the Minister of Justice Under Section 690 of the Criminal Code, 17 WINDSOR 
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 5 (1999). 
 27. See generally Regulations Respecting Applications for Ministerial Review—
Miscarriages of Justice: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, 136:39 CAN. GAZETTE, PT. 
I, at 2977–79 (Sept. 28, 2002) (providing a list of the proposed new regulations). 
 28. MINISTER OF JUSTICE, APPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW: MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter MINISTERIAL REVIEW APPLICATION]; 
Braiden & Brockman, supra note 26, at 20–28. 
 29. MINISTERIAL REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 30. See generally Regulations Respecting Applications for Ministerial Review—
Miscarriages of Justice: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, supra note 27, at 2977 
(providing a breakdown of the amended regulations for application of ministerial review). 
 31. MINISTER OF JUSTICE, APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REVIEW 3 [hereinafter 
CONVICTION REVIEW APPLICATION]. 
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appeals court and at the Supreme Court.32 The information 
presented in support of the application must represent new and 
significant information that was not previously considered by the 
courts and is reasonably capable of belief.33 Guidelines from the 
Department of Justice in 2003 listed a number of examples of new 
and significant information that would support a conviction-review 
application: information that would establish or confirm an alibi; 
another person’s confession; information that identifies another 
person at the scene of the crime; scientific evidence that points to 
innocence or another’s guilt; proof that important evidence was not 
disclosed; information that shows a witness gave false testimony; 
and information that substantially contradicts testimony at trial.34 
When the CCRG assesses whether information is new and 
significant, the test applied is similar to that used by the courts in 
determining the admissibility of new or “fresh” evidence on appeal: 
it must be relevant; reasonably capable of belief; and such that, if 
taken with the other evidence presented at trial, it could 
reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.35 However, the 
applicant must also satisfy the Minister that there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that “a miscarriage of justice likely occurred,”36 
given the new and significant information. This is not part of the 
normal test for an appeal against conviction and means that the 
standard applied to conviction review is higher than the test that 
would be applied at the subsequent court hearing, should the case 
be referred.37 Problematically, no further guidance or precedent is 
available as to what might constitute a miscarriage of justice—it 
is purely a matter of policy for the Minister, who does not publish 
reasons for his or her decisions. As a result, applicants have little 
or no idea what might suffice.38 
The CCRG’s investigations can involve interviewing 
witnesses, forensic testing and analysis of evidence, and 
consultation with lawyers, police, and prosecutors.39 The CCRG 
 
 32. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 696.1, par. 1. 
 33. MINISTERIAL REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 28, at 6. 
 34. These are re-produced in Applying for a Conviction Review. CONVICTION REVIEW 
APPLICATION, supra note 31, at 2. 
 35. MINISTERIAL REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 28, at 6. 
 36. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 696.3, par. 3, subpar. a. 
 37. HERSH WOLCH & JOANNE MCLEAN, IN THE MATTER OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID EDGAR MILGAARD: SUBMISSIONS 79 (2008). 
 38. See infra Table 1 (demonstrating a low number of applicants, which might be 
explained by applicants’ lack of guidance). 
 39. CONVICTION REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 31, at 3. 
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has the authority to compel the production of documents as well as 
the appearance and testimony of witnesses.40 The CCRG completes 
an investigative report, which is viewed by the applicant and 
forwarded to the Minister of Justice.41 “[I]f the Minister is satisfied 
that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of 
justice likely occurred” he or she may either order a new trial or 
refer the matter to the Court of Appeal of a province or territory as 
if it were an appeal by the convicted person.42 
At this stage, Crown Counsel of the originating province have 
a number of remedies available to them to move forward, including 
conducting a new trial, withdrawal of the charges, offering no 
evidence (resulting in a not guilty verdict), or entering a stay of 
proceedings.43 In the latter case, the charges are “on hold” for one 
year and the Crown retains the power to “recommence the 
proceedings on the same indictment.”44 
B. The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission 
In Scotland, post-conviction review is undertaken by the 
Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). The 
SCCRC was established in 1999,45 two years after the English 
CCRC, on the recommendation of the Sutherland Committee.46 
Before the SCCRC existed, convicted persons who had exhausted 
the normal appeal process had to apply to the Secretary of State 
for Scotland (a Government Minister) to have their convictions 
reconsidered, a scheme similar to that presently operating in 
Canada.47 Since its establishment, anyone who has been convicted 
 
 40. MINISTERIAL REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 28, at 3. 
 41. CONVICTION REVIEW APPLICATION, supra note 31, at 34. 
 42. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 696.3, par. 3, subpar. a. 
 43. KENT ROACH, REPORT RELATING TO PARAGRAPH 1(F) OF THE ORDER IN COUNCIL FOR 
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF 
JAMES DRISKELL 21–24, available at http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/pdf/roachreport.pdf. 
 44. KATHRYN CAMPBELL, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE IN CANADA: CAUSES, RESPONSES, 
REMEDIES 343 (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2018); see also PATRICK J. LESAGE, 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND 
CONVICTION OF JAMES DRISKELL 127, 129, 132–33 (2007) (describing this as “not a 
satisfactory final remedy”). 
 45. Legislative Framework, SCCRC, http://www.sccrc.org.uk/legislative-framework 
(last visited July 9, 2017). 
 46. STEWART R. SUTHERLAND, CRIMINAL APPEALS AND ALLEGED MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE: REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
SCOTLAND AND THE LORD ADVOCATE Cm.3245, ¶ 5.50 (1996). 
 47. Id. at ¶¶ 5.1, 5.60. 
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of a criminal offense in Scotland can apply to the SCCRC.48 It can 
review sentences and convictions49 and it is empowered to deal 
with both solemn and summary cases.50 A claim does not have to 
be made by the convicted person—it can be made in respect of a 
deceased person in order to posthumously clear their name.51 Still, 
the applicant does need to have a legitimate connection with the 
convicted person—victims of the crime or relatives of victims do 
not have standing to apply.52 
The SCCRC has a number of legal officers,53 an annual budget 
of over £1 million54 to conduct investigations, and extensive legal 
powers to compel other parties (both public bodies and private 
individuals) to provide information it deems necessary.55 One third 
of the SCCRC Commissioners must be solicitors or advocates of at 
least ten years standing and a further third must have knowledge 
or experience of the criminal justice system.56 In practice there 
have been between six and eight Commissioners57 and, 
traditionally, two have always been lay members, such as 
academics and figures from the church.  
The SCCRC has no power to quash a conviction but can refer 
a case back to the court and it is then for the court to determine 
the appeal. The grounds upon which the SCCRC can refer a case 
are that it believes: (a) “a miscarriage of justice may have 
occurred”; and (b) “it is in the interests of justice that a reference 
 
 48. See Peter Duff, Criminal Cases Review Commissions and Deference to the Courts: 
The Evaluation of Evidence and Evidentiary Rules, CRIM. L. REV. 341, 352–55 (2001) 
(comparing that as in Canada, the option of applying to the Royal Prerogative of Mercy still 
exists alongside the SCCRC but applications are very rarely—if ever—now made). 
 49. See SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2014–15, 14 (2016) 
(explaining that approximately one fifth of applications are for sentence review) [hereinafter 
SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT]; see also James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, The Scottish 
Criminal Cases Review Commission and Its Referrals to the Appeal Court: The First Ten 
Years, CRIM. L. REV. 608, 615–20 (2010) (discussing the Commission’s sentence review 
function). 
 50. In Scotland, cases can be prosecuted under solemn or summary procedure. Solemn 
procedure is reserved for the most serious cases (known as “indictable” cases) and involves 
the use of a jury to determine guilt. Summary procedure (where cases are prosecuted on a 
“complaint”) is used for less serious cases. Around a fifth of applications relate to summary 
cases. SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 17. 
 51. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, c.46, s.194(B)(4). 
 52. Scottish Crim. Cases Review Comm’n v. Swire [2015] S.L.T. 556 (HCA) at ¶ 23. 
 53. SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 49. At the time of writing, the number 
of legal officers was seven. 
 54. Id. at 59. At the time of writing, this equates to approximately $1.25 million. 
 55. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, c.46, s.194(H)–(IA). 
 56. Id. s.194(A). 
 57. Straddling Two Worlds, supra note 13, at 694. 
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should be made.”58 The phrase miscarriage of justice is a reference 
to the legal test for determining appeals against conviction in 
Scotland,59 not to the factual innocence of the applicant. In order 
for a conviction to be quashed in Scotland, the court must be 
satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice based on a 
legally recognized factor. Two are specified in legislation: the 
existence of evidence that was not heard at the original 
proceedings60 and an unreasonable jury verdict.61 Others are set 
out in caselaw and all relate to some sort of procedural irregularity 
such as evidence wrongfully admitted or excluded, trial judge 
misdirection, or defective legal representation.62 This does mean 
that, unlike in Canada or North Carolina, the SCCRC is not 
restricted to looking at cases in which additional evidence has 
emerged—its references can span the whole range of grounds for 
appeal. 
C. The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission 
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) 
was established in 2006,63 on the advice of the North Carolina 
Actual Innocence Commission—a body set up in 2002 to make 
recommendations aimed at reducing the risk of wrongful 
conviction.64 The NCIIC has eight commissioners,65 and these must 
include a superior court judge, a prosecuting attorney, a victim 
 
 58. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, c.46, s.194(C). 
 59. Id. s.106. 
 60. Id. s.106(3)(a). 
 61. Id. s.106(3)(b). 
 62. See FIONA LEVERICK, JAMES CHALMERS, SARAH ARMSTRONG & FERGUS MCNEILL, 
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 10TH ANNIVERSARY RESEARCH: FINAL 
REPORT 18–20 (2009) (providing a comprehensive list of the sort of procedural irregularity). 
 63. The NCIIC was established by Article 92 of the North Carolina General Statutes 
(subsequently “NCGS”). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1461; see Kent Roach, An Independent 
Commission to Review Claims of Wrongful Convictions: Lessons from North Carolina?, 58 
CRIM. L.Q. 283, 284–85 (2012) (discussing the NCIIC in depth) [hereinafter Independent 
Commission]; Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1345–47 (2007) (surveying the 
history of the NCIIC). 
 64. Christine C. Mumma, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon 
Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 648 (2004). 
 65. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 2015–16 REGULAR 
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE STATE JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL ii (2015) [hereinafter N.C. ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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advocate, a defense attorney, a sheriff, a person who is not an 
attorney or employed by the judicial department, and two others.66 
The NCIIC will only consider applications from those who 
have been convicted of a felony in a North Carolina state court67 
and—unlike the CCRG and SCCRC—where the applicant is 
alive.68 Most significantly, the statutory criteria require that the 
applicant be asserting “complete[] innocence of any criminal 
responsibility for the felony.”69 Claims of secondary involvement, 
or of a reduced level of culpability are not considered claims of 
complete factual innocence. Furthermore, credible and verifiable 
evidence of innocence must exist,70 and this must not have been 
previously heard at trial or in a post-conviction hearing.71 
If, after a preliminary review, the Executive Director 
determines that the statutory criteria are met, the case moves into 
a formal inquiry phase. Priority is given to cases where the 
claimant is currently incarcerated.72 The investigation phase is a 
“detailed and lengthy process that involves interviewing 
witnesses, obtaining affidavits, seeking court orders for evidence, 
testing of physical evidence, and compiling of documentation.”73 
The NCIIC has substantial powers of investigation—it can, for 
example, issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of 
witnesses.74 It also has the power to compel the testimony of 
witnesses who invoke their privilege against self-incrimination.75 
If, during the formal inquiry, credible and verifiable new 
evidence of actual innocence is uncovered, the case progresses to a 
hearing before the eight commissioners.76 Like the SCCRC and 
CCRG, the NCIIC cannot itself quash convictions but can refer a 
case back to the courts. The test that must be met for it to do so is 
that there is “sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit 
 
 66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1463. 
 67. Id. § 15A-1460(1). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1466(2). 
 73. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 2009–2010 LONG SESSION OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 3 (2010). 
 74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(d)–(f). 
 75. Id. § 15A-1468(a1). The Commission Chairperson (a Superior Court Judge) may 
provide limited immunity to the person against a prosecution for perjury. 
 76. Id. § 15A-1468. 
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judicial review.”77 The panel of eight commissioners do not have to 
agree; a majority decision is permissible.78 Nevertheless, a 
unanimous decision is required when the applicant pled guilty.79 
Unlike the SCCRC or the CCRG, the NCIIC has the discretion to 
make its hearings public.80 Even when the NCIIC does not hold a 
public hearing, a transcript of proceedings is made which must be 
released if the case is referred to the courts.81 
If the NCIIC refers a case, the Chief Justice of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court then appoints a special three-judge panel 
to hear it.82 A more stringent standard applies to referred cases 
than to appeals against conviction generally.83 All three judges 
must unanimously decide that there is “clear and convincing 
evidence that the convicted person is innocent of the charges”84 in 
order to exonerate the convicted person. 
V. THE SCHEMES IN PRACTICE 
As might be expected, given their different constitutions and 
remits, the three different post-conviction review bodies differ 
considerably in terms of key measures such as the number of 
applications they receive, the proportion of these that are referred 
back to the courts, and the “success rate” of the referred 
applications. Table 1 summarizes these differences: 
 
 
 
 77. Id. § 15A-1468(c). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. This is significant as 39% of applications have been from those who pled guilty. 
NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, INNOCENCECOMMISSION-NC.GOV (2017),  
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/stats.html (last visited July 9, 2017). “For the first 
two years of its existence, the NCIIC [did] not allow any claims from defendants who [pled] 
guilty” at all. See Maiatico, supra note 63, at 1360. 
 80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1468(a). The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission 
also has discretion to make its hearings public. Ulf Stridbeck & Svein Magnussen, Opening 
Potentially Wrongful Convictions—Look to Norway, 58 CRIM. L.Q. 267, 271 (2012). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1468(e). For transcripts of the cases that have been referred 
to date, see Cases, INNOCENCEOMMISSION-NC.GOV, http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/cases.html (last visited July 9, 2017). 
 82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(a). 
 83. Independent Commission, supra note 63, at 286. 
 84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(h). 
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Table 1: The Post-Conviction Review Bodies Compared 
Statistics NCIIC SCCRC CCRG 
Applications 1724 
(2007–2015) 
1594 
(1999–2015) 
272 
(2002–2015) 
Applications 
annually 
(approx.) 
205 (0.7% of 
convicted 
persons) 
100 (0.1% of 
convicted 
persons) 
21 (0.008% 
of convicted 
persons) 
Referral rate 11 
convictions 
(0.64%) 
71 convictions 
(4.5%) 
16 
convictions 
(5.8%) 
Success rate (of 
determined 
cases)85 
9 convictions 
quashed 
(90%) 
33 convictions 
quashed 
(48%) 
13 
convictions 
overturned 
(93%) 
A. Application Rates 
Of the three bodies, the NCIIC has the highest application 
rate, which is perhaps not surprising given that a number of the 
factors known to contribute to wrongful conviction—such as 
ineffective defense representation and substantial incentives 
offered to induce guilty pleas—are particularly pervasive in the 
U.S.86 In its most recent annual report, the NCIIC reported that it 
received 1,837 applications since the Commission’s creation: 1,724 
cases have been concluded,87 and the “Commission receives an 
average of 205 claims each year”88 (an annual application rate of 
approximately 0.7% of convicted persons).89 The SCCRC’s 
application rate is considerably lower. As of March 31, 2015, the 
 
 85. The percentage figures in this row do not take account of cases that are yet to be 
determined. 
 86. JAMES CHALMERS & FIONA LEVERICK, CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION, in POST-
CORROBORATION SAFEGUARDS REVIEW: REPORT OF THE ACADEMIC EXPERT GROUP 30, 39 
(James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & Alasdair Shaw eds., 2014), available at 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/00460650.pdf [hereinafter CAUSES OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION]. 
 87. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2016). 
 88. This figure was provided in the previous year’s annual report. N.C. ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 65, at 9. It was omitted from the latest report but remains broadly similar. 
 89. In 2013–14, the number of persons convicted of a felony in North Carolina was 
28,130. N.C. SENTENCING AND POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING 
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR 2013/14, at 3 (2015), 
available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/ 
CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/statisticalrpt_fy13-14.pdf. 
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SCCRC had received 1,594 applications for review of a conviction,90 
which over the 16 years of the SCCRC’s operation is roughly 100 
applications for conviction review per year (an annual application 
rate of 0.1% of convicted persons).91 The CCRG, however, has by 
far the lowest application rate of the three bodies. In the 13-year 
period between 2002 and 2015,92 the CCRG received 272 
applications, which equates to around 21 applications per year (an 
annual application rate of approximately 0.008% of convicted 
persons).93 The reasons for the low rate of applications cannot be 
known for sure, but a lack of awareness or sufficient knowledge 
about the scheme, the opaqueness of the criteria for review, and a 
lack of confidence in the impartiality of the Minister are likely 
factors. 
B. Referral Rates 
While it has by far the lowest application rate, the CCRG has 
the highest rate of referral of the three bodies. Of the 272 
applications, 16 resulted in the Minister concluding that a 
miscarriage of justice likely occurred, a referral rate of 5.8%.94 The 
referral rate for the SCCRC is similar to that of the CCRG, 
although it is based on a far greater number of applications. Of the 
SCCRC’s 1,580 conviction review applications that had concluded, 
the SCCRC has referred 71 of these to the court, a rate of 4.5%.95 
It is the NCIIC that has by far the lowest referral rate, although, 
 
 90. SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 14 (noting that 2,018 applications were 
received in total); id. at 17 Table 2 (noting that 79% of 2,018 applications, which calculates 
to 1,594 applications, were for conviction review—the remaining applications were only for 
review of sentence). 
 91. In fiscal years 2013–14, the number of persons convicted in the Scottish courts was 
105,549. Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2013–14, GOV.SCOT Table 2a (2014), available 
at http://www.gov 
.scot/Resource/0048/00481722.pdf. 
 92. It is not possible to obtain application figures before 2002. 
 93. For 2013–14, approximately 360,000 cases were concluded in the Canadian adult 
criminal courts. Of that number, about two-thirds (63%) “resulted in a finding of guilt.” 
ASHLEY MAXWELL, ADULT CRIMINAL COURT STATISTICS, 2013/2014, at 4, 8 (Sept. 28, 2015) 
available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2015001/article/14226-eng.pdf. 
     94.   CAMPBELL (forthcoming 2018), supra note 44, at 345. 
 95. SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 25. It should be noted that the Annual 
Report refers to 74 convictions having been referred, but personal correspondence with the 
SCCRC indicated that this figure was an error and that 71 was the correct figure and the 
SCCRC’s website now reflects this. See Conviction, SCCRC.ORG.UK (2017), 
http://www.sccrc.org.uk./conviction (last visited July 9, 2017) (listing 74 referred conviction 
cases). 
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given the far more stringent standard of review operated by the 
NCIIC, this is hardly surprising. At the time of writing, 11 
convictions had been referred to the court by the NCIIC,96 a 
referral rate of 0.64%. 
C. The Outcome of Referred Cases 
The NCIIC might refer very few cases, but of the cases it does 
refer, the vast majority result in the conviction being quashed by 
the courts. Of the eleven NCIIC referrals, at the time of writing 
one was still awaiting a hearing. Of the remaining ten, nine 
convictions were quashed at the court stage.97 This equates to a 
90% success rate,98 though the small numbers involved make the 
statistic of limited value. All of the exonerated individuals served 
at least ten years in prison prior to exoneration; four prisoners 
served over thirty years.99 
While very few cases ever make it through the CCRG process, 
most cases that are referred back to the provincial/territorial 
courts of appeal are successful. Of the sixteen cases referred back 
to the courts “over a [thirteen]-year period (2002–2015),” four 
involved the applicant being acquitted at the Court of Appeal or 
Supreme Court.100 In the remaining twelve cases, the courts 
ordered a new trial, but only one applicant was reconvicted (and 
that was of a lesser charge). Of the remainder, in five cases the 
proceedings were stayed by the Crown, one had the charges 
withdrawn, and three cases resulted in an acquittal.101 Overall, 
 
 96. Nine cases were referred, but two of these involved two co-accused. Cases, supra 
note 81. In line with the Scottish analysis, the figures for individual convictions are used 
here rather than the case figures. 
 97. NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, supra note 79. Seven of the 
referred cases were dealt by the appeals court as appeals against conviction, and three were 
dealt by the original trial court as motions for appropriate relief. The distinction is 
unimportant here, as the outcome in all nine instances was that the applicant was 
exonerated. 
 98. The one unsuccessful case was the only one where the referral decision was not 
unanimous. N.C. Innocence Inquiry Comm’n, State v. Reeves, INNOCENCECOMMISSION-
NC.GOV, http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/reeves.html (last visited July 9, 2017). 
 99. See Cases, supra note 81 (illustrating the cases of Willie Womble (38 years), Joseph 
Sledge (38 years), Leon Brown (30 years), and Henry McCollum (30 years)). 
   100. CAMPBELL (forthcoming 2018), supra note 44, at 345–46. Information on these 
sixteen cases also came with additional help from Nathalie Vautour of the CCRG. 
 101. In the two remaining cases, the outcome is unknown as they are still before the 
courts. 
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this translates into a 93% success rate,102 though, again, such small 
numbers make generalization difficult. 
The figures relating to North Carolina and Canada stand in 
contrast to those for the SCCRC. Of the 71 cases referred to the 
court by the SCCRC, two appeals were abandoned and must be 
discounted from the analysis. Of the remaining 69 cases, 33 
resulted in the conviction being quashed—a “success rate” of only 
48%.103 While this is considerably lower than the relevant figure 
for either North Carolina’s NCIIC or the Canadian CCRG, it does 
need to be understood in the context of the higher number of 
referred cases and the wider terms of reference of the SCCRC 
compared to the other two bodies.104 Unlike the NCIIC and the 
CCRG, the SCCRC is not limited in its referrals to cases where 
fresh evidence emerges post-conviction. New evidence is the most 
frequent ground for referral, but it accounts for only 35% of 
cases.105 Even after adding “failure to disclose” cases (a ground of 
referral that relates closely to the existence of new evidence), the 
figure only amounts to 50%.106 Half of the referred cases are 
referred on other grounds (most commonly errors of law or trial 
judge misdirection at the original trial)107 that would not meet the 
criteria for referral in the Canadian CCRG or in North Carolina’s 
NCIIC. 
VI. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF A POST-CONVICTION 
REVIEW BODY 
A. Is Post-Conviction Review Necessary? 
An initial question is whether there is a need for post-
conviction review at all. Finality is an important value in the legal 
system and the existence of post-conviction review clearly reduces 
this.108 Closure is delayed and increased demands are made on the 
 
 102. This does not include the case where the applicant was convicted of a lesser charge 
as a “success.” If this case was included, the “success rate” would be 100%. 
 103. This rate has fluctuated over time—over the first ten years, the proportion of 
conviction referrals where the court quashed the conviction was 60%. Chalmers & Leverick, 
supra note 49, at 616. 
 104. See infra text accompanying note 157 (comparing the referral rates). 
 105. SCOTTISH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 21. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 20–21. 
 108. Kate Malleson, Appeals Against Conviction and the Principle of Finality, 21 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 151, 159 (1994). 
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public purse.109 But in the modern era, with the advent of DNA 
exonerations,110 to the best of our knowledge, no one has seriously 
argued against the need for some form of post-conviction review. It 
is sometimes suggested that the role of post-conviction reviews 
should be very limited,111 but the need for “closure” is a very weak 
argument when put against clear and convincing evidence that 
someone is suffering a deprivation of liberty for a crime they did 
not commit.112 Such evidence sometimes emerges many years later 
after the normal appeals process has been exhausted,113 and justice 
dictates that there needs to be some sort of right of redress for 
wrongly convicted persons when this happens. 
One such route might be through an executive system of 
pardons, like the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.114 But it is not 
appropriate to operate a system where this is the only way to deal 
with claims of wrongful conviction.115 It is a discretionary (and 
therefore potentially inequitable)116 remedy that lacks 
transparency117 and is exercised by a member of the executive.118 
 
 109. Peter H. Howden, Judging Errors of Judgment: Accountability, Independence and 
Vulnerability in a Post-Appellate Conviction Review Process, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 
569, 583–86 (2002). 
 110. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (referring to the Innocence Project). 
 111. David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1081 (2010); Maiatico, supra note 63, at 1373. 
 112. As noted earlier, in North Carolina, where clear and convincing evidence of 
innocence is a pre-requisite for exoneration after an application to the NCIIC, two of the 
exonerated applicants had served over 35 years in prison. See supra note 99 and 
accompanying text (showing the years that cases illustrated). 
 113. In Canada, for example, Steven Truscott was wrongly convicted for the rape and 
murder of Lynn Harper in 1959. He received the death penalty, which was later commuted 
to life imprisonment. Truscott’s conviction was finally overturned in 2007 following a 
conviction review of his case. The Ontario Court of Appeal heard new forensic entomological 
evidence that indicated a different time of death for Harper, effectively ruling out Truscott 
as her killer. Truscott (Re), 2007 ONCA 575, ¶¶ 13–40 (CanLII) (available at 
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2007/ 
2007onca575/2007onca575.html). 
 114. The Royal Prerogative of Mercy still exists in some form in most common law 
jurisdictions, including those that have established independent criminal cases review 
commissions. Jennifer Schweppe, Pardon Me: The Contemporary Application of the 
Prerogative of Mercy, 49 IRISH JURIST  211, 211 (2013). 
 115. Whether the Royal Prerogative of Mercy might still play a useful role alongside 
another method of dealing with wrongful conviction claims is a separate issue. See 
Schweppe, supra note 114, at 226 (providing an argument that it does). 
 116. Trotter, supra note 24, at 343. 
 117. Sue Milne, The Second or Subsequent Criminal Appeal, the Prerogative of Mercy and 
the Judicial Inquiry: The Continuing Advance of Post-Conviction Review, 36 ADEL. L. REV. 
211, 212 (2015). 
 118. For the importance of independence, see infra notes 125–35 and accompanying text 
(providing further discussion on the importance of independence). 
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In addition, and perhaps most significantly, the effect of a pardon 
is not to remove the conviction; its effect is still to imply that the 
person concerned did something wrong.119 But, as Smith put it, 
“[w]here a person has been wrongly convicted, he seeks justice and 
not mercy.”120 If an error is made by the criminal courts, the 
legitimate and just response is to rectify the error by quashing the 
conviction in question. 
The question then arises of whether post-conviction review is 
something that can be effectively achieved by the courts alone. In 
South Australia, the introduction of an independent criminal cases 
review commission was considered, but ultimately the decision 
was made to establish a new process for out-of-time appeals where 
fresh evidence of innocence emerges.121 The convicted person, 
instead of applying to an independent body or to a Minister, simply 
applies to the court: the Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act of 
2013 amended the Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1935 to give 
convicted persons a second or subsequent appeal in cases where 
there is “fresh and compelling evidence” of a wrongful conviction 
and it is in the interests of justice.122 But, as critics of the South 
Australian legislation have pointed out, this is to ignore the 
difficulties that convicted persons face in trying to obtain fresh 
evidence of innocence, especially when they are incarcerated.123 As 
we have seen, the CCRG, SCCRC, and NCIIC all have considerable 
powers of investigation and resources to investigate claims. This is 
an important strength of the system in all three jurisdictions and 
serves to counter—at least in part—the disadvantage the wrongly 
convicted person faces in terms of having the time, money, and 
legal powers needed to collect evidence.124 It might be countered 
that such assistance can be provided by volunteer innocence 
 
 119. Trotter, supra note 24, at 343–44. 
 120. A. T. H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice, 
PUB. L. 398, 421 (1983). 
 121. Rachel Dioso-Villa, ‘Out of Grace’: Inequity in Post-Exoneration Remedies for 
Wrongful Conviction, 37 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 349, 374 (2014). 
 122. See Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013 (SA) § 7 (inserting section 353A into 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935). For discussion, see Milne, supra note 117, at 
212. 
 123. Lynne Weathered, Wrongful Conviction in Australia, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1391, 1409–
10 (2012); Bibi Sangha, Robert Moles & Kim Economides, The New Statutory Right of 
Appeal in South Australian Criminal Law: Problems Facing an Applicant—Unanticipated 
Interpretive Difficulties, 16 FLINDERS L.J. 145, 185 (2014). 
 124. Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Towards the Formation of “Innocence 
Commissions” in America, 86 JUDICATURE, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 98, 104. 
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projects, but that ignores the superior legal powers that the CCRG, 
SCCRC, and NCIIC have to compel the production of evidence from 
individuals and organizations.125 Proving innocence is a daunting 
task, and if a post-conviction review body is to operate effectively, 
it needs to have the power and resources to investigate individual 
cases.126 
B. Is Independence Required? 
The next question, if it is accepted that there is a case for a 
post-conviction review body, is what form that body should take 
and, in particular, whether its effectiveness requires it to be 
independent of government. As we have seen, post-conviction 
review is carried out by an independent body in North Carolina 
and Scotland. In Canada, however, the ultimate decision on 
referral is made by the Minister of Justice, albeit advised by the 
CCRG and its special advisers. 
The need for independence is certainly the basis on which 
some have argued for the establishment of criminal cases review 
commissions in jurisdictions where they do not yet exist, such as 
Australia,127 most states in the U.S.,128 and Canada.129 Further, 
this lack of independence has been proffered as the reason for the 
 
 125. On the question of whether there is still a useful role to be played by Innocence 
Projects in a jurisdiction with an independent post-conviction review scheme, see Stephanie 
Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and 
Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (2009) (arguing that the Innocence Project and the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission can work together effectively to assist the factually innocent); Hannah 
Quirk, Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer, 70 
MOD. L. REV. 759, 762 (2007) (arguing that the use of the Innocence Project “to do the work 
of Criminal Cases Review Commission” is dangerous and ill-advised). 
 126. The difficulty of proving innocence is illustrated by the case of Kenneth Kagonyera, 
who was exonerated after almost ten years imprisonment, following an application to the 
NCIIC. He worked with other agencies in an attempt to secure DNA testing prior to his 
application, but it was only following his application to the NCIIC that this testing (which 
was to prove his innocence) was carried out. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, REPORT TO 
THE 2011–2012 SHORT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE 
STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 5 (2012). 
 127. Hamer, supra note 11, at 311 (focusing on why New South Wales and Australia 
should adopt a similar model to the CCRC). 
 128. See Robert C. Schehr & Lynne Weathered, Should the United States Establish a 
Criminal Cases Review Commission?, 88 JUDICATURE Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 122, 145 
(discussing potential approaches in the United States).  
 129. Four of the six independent commissions of inquiry into the wrongful conviction of 
individuals held in Canada to date have recommended the establishment of an independent 
entity such as a criminal case review board to replace the current system. See Walker & 
Campbell, supra note 13, at 197–98 (documenting other recommendations). 
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low numbers applying to the CCRG in Canada,130 as potential 
applicants with genuine claims may lack confidence that these will 
be impartially reviewed.131 Wrongful conviction can sometimes be 
the result of a State’s malpractice, and it is important that a post-
conviction review body is free from political pressures in 
investigating such claims. That said, there is no obvious evidence 
of actual bias in Canada, where the CCRG has referred cases 
involving errors on the part of police officers and Crown 
Attorneys.132 
Even if no actual bias exists, perception is still important. As 
the Sutherland Committee put it, a post-conviction review body 
needs to “command public confidence: justice should not only be 
done, but be seen to be done.”133 There is a danger that the 
Canadian system “does not command the same [level of] confidence 
[to] potential applicants” (or the wider public) as an independent 
commission would: the result being that some with genuine claims 
of innocence are put off from applying.134 The appearance of 
independence is especially important because post-conviction 
review bodies are almost certainly going to reject the vast majority 
of claims they receive, given their stringent application criteria (as 
is evidenced by referral rates in Canada, North Carolina, and 
Scotland of 5.8%, 0.64%, and 4.5% respectively). Independence 
helps to secure public confidence that the rejected claims were in 
fact lacking merit, whereas rejection by a government minister 
might leave a lingering suspicion that claims are being rejected to 
cover up state impropriety.135 It can also contribute to public 
confidence not just in the post-conviction review body itself, but 
also in the wider criminal justice system. If the vast majority of 
claims are rejected by a genuinely independent body, this is 
 
 130. As noted earlier, the CCRG has received only 272 applications over a sixteen-year 
period, far fewer in comparative terms than the SCCRC or NCIIC. See supra Table 1. 
 131. See Walker & Campbell, supra note 13, at 199 (arguing that “the failure to construct 
a less Ministerial-based system remains inconsistent with the federal government’s aim to 
increase ‘transparency and accountability’ around the process”). 
 132. E.g., Re Walsh, [2008] NBCA 33. 
 133. SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, at ¶ 5.30. 
 134. Independent Commission, supra note 63, at 288. 
 135. Mary Kelly Tate, Commissioning Innocence and Restoring Confidence: The North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission and the Missing Deliberative Citizen, 64 ME. L. 
REV. 531, 552 (2012); Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 124, at 100. 
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credible evidence that should reassure the public that the police, 
prosecutors, and courts do get it right most of the time.136 
C. The Test for Referral and Conceptions of “Innocence” 
As we have seen, the three post-conviction review bodies 
employ very different tests for referral of a case back to the court 
of appeal. At one end of the spectrum, the NCIIC refers cases only 
where there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence. What is 
more, it limits such claims to those who had no involvement in the 
crime—convicted persons cannot apply on the basis they 
performed the act but lacked mens rea, that they had a recognized 
defense (such as self-defense), or that they should have been 
convicted of a lesser offense. This narrow conception has resulted 
in a referral rate of only 0.64%, by far the lowest of the three 
jurisdictions, but a success rate of 90% when the cases reach 
court.137 In Canada, the test is wider. Cases are referred where 
there exists new and significant information that was not 
previously considered by the courts, creating a reasonable belief 
that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred. This would include 
cases of prosecutorial non-disclosure, but would not encompass 
claims of errors of law or procedure (such as trial judge 
misdirection or wrongful admission of evidence). The referral rate 
of the CCRG is 5.8%, and most referrals have resulted in the 
conviction being quashed, with a success rate of 93%, although all 
of this does have to be placed in context of the extremely low 
number of applications.138 In Scotland, the test is wider still. Cases 
can be referred by the SCCRC on the basis that any arguable 
ground of appeal exists, including but not limited to the existence 
of new evidence. The referral rate there is 4.5%,139 and half of these 
cases have been referred on the basis of procedural errors 
(something that would not be possible in either North Carolina or 
Canada). However, less than half of the cases referred resulted in 
the conviction being quashed when the case reached court, with a 
 
 136. Graham Zellick, The Criminal Cases Review Commission and the Court of Appeal: 
The Commission’s Perspective, CRIM. L. REV. 937, 950 (2005). 
   137.  See supra Table 1 (comparing the post-conviction review bodies). 
   138. Id. (comparing the number of applicants, referral rates, and success rates between 
the CCRC, NCIIC, and the SCCRC). 
   139. Id. (failing to show the different standards each body follows). 
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success rate for referrals at 48%,140 a figure far lower than that of 
North Carolina or Canada. 
What then should the test for referral be? There is no “correct” 
answer to this question, and to a certain extent the answer must 
depend on the prevailing legal and political culture.141 The test 
used in North Carolina is about as narrow as it is possible to 
envisage, but, it does run the risk of considerable injustice. Those 
who acted without mens rea, or who had a recognized justification 
defense such as self-defense, cannot apply, but it is difficult to see 
how they are any less innocent in moral terms than those who can 
demonstrate that they were not involved in the incident at all.142 
The NCIIC test would also rule out referral if the applicant had 
fresh evidence supporting a partial defense (such as diminished 
capacity), and excluding these cases is also an injustice (perhaps 
not to the same extent as excluding those cases where the 
applicant should not have been convicted at all).143 It is not just the 
fact of a conviction that is important but also what the conviction 
is for, both in terms of fair labelling144 and in terms of ensuring 
proportionality of punishment.145 
The focus on demonstrable factual innocence is also 
problematic. As Roach has pointed out, on one level, it is appealing 
because of the “clear injustice”146 of convicting the factually 
innocent. Wolitz claims that it “serves an important signaling 
function to the wider public: it assures state citizens that only the 
most worthy petitioners, those with clear and positive evidence of 
innocence, will be exonerated.”147 It also acts to protect the public 
by minimizing the risk of factually guilty and possibly dangerous 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 124, at 101. 
 142. Christopher Sherrin, Declarations of Innocence, 35 QUEENS L.J. 354, 469–70 (2010). 
 143. By contrast, the SCCRC has referred a number of cases on this basis. See, e.g., 
Lilburn v. H.M. Advocate [2015] HCJAC 50; Kalyanjee v. H.M. Advocate [2014] HJAC 44. 
This is also true of the Norwegian Commission and the English CCRC. See Ulf Stridbeck & 
Svein Magnussen, Prevention of Wrongful Convictions: Norwegian Legal Safeguards and 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2012) (referring to 
the Norwegian Commission); ELKS, supra note 13, at 188 (referring to the English CCRC). 
 144. See James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MOD. L. 
REV. 217, 223 (2008) (discussing the history of criminal offense labelling and the effects of 
over-categorizing crimes). 
 145. ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (7th ed. 
2013). 
 146. Independent Commission, supra note 63, at 299. 
 147. Wolitz, supra note 111, at 1081. 
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applicants being released into the community.148 But, as evidenced 
by the fact that only eleven convictions have been referred by the 
NCIIC since its inception,149 this does need to be balanced against 
considerations of justice to individual applicants. Even for those 
who are factually innocent, conclusive proof of factual innocence 
can be very hard to come by because it requires proving a 
negative.150 Innocence is, as a former English CCRC Commissioner 
stated, “damnably difficult to prove.”151 A test requiring proof of 
innocence benefits primarily those who have DNA evidence at 
their disposal,152 but this will not exist in the majority of cases.153 
The NCIIC itself even recognizes this, stating that in 20% of the 
applications it rejects there would have been no possible way of 
demonstrating factual innocence.154 It may be, of course, that this 
test was the only one that was politically acceptable in North 
Carolina and that if a wider test had been contemplated there 
would have been no way to secure the political agreement needed 
for the NCIIC’s establishment.155 A Commission with a very 
narrow test is better than having no Commission at all, but in 
terms of securing justice in individual cases, it leaves a justice 
deficit that is difficult to defend in principled terms. 
A more inclusive test is that of the Canadian CCRG where the 
focus is on fresh evidence that indicates a miscarriage of justice 
likely occurred (which includes cases of prosecutorial non-
disclosure). The formulation of the test can be criticized for its 
vagueness and the fact that it is a more difficult test to meet than 
that applied by the court.156 But it also gives rise to a broader 
question—should a post-conviction review body restrict its ambit 
 
 148. Maiatico, supra note 63, at 1373. 
 149. Cf. Zalman’s estimate of a 0.5–1% rate of wrongful conviction in the U.S. See 
Zalman, supra note 22 and accompanying text (estimating a general wrongful conviction 
rate, based on qualitative analysis). 
 150. Roberts & Weathered, supra note 125, at 58; Weeden, supra note 9, at 198. 
 151. David Jessel, Innocence or Safety: Why the Wrongly Convicted Are Better Served by 
Safety, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2009, 5:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
uk/2009/dec/15/prisons-and-probation. 
 152. Independent Commission, supra note 63, at 301. 
 153. Quirk, supra note 125, at 769. 
 154. NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, supra note 79. 
 155. For a discussion of the role of politics in wrongful conviction related law reform, see 
Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955, 
964–74 (2014). 
 156. See WOLCH & MCLEAN, supra note 37 and accompanying text (criticizing the high 
standards that are applied to conviction review as compared to other subsequent court 
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2017] Post-Conviction Review Questions  69 
to cases where there is fresh evidence, or should it also be possible 
to refer cases because there was a procedural error (such as a trial 
judge misdirection or other error of law) affecting the fairness of 
the applicant’s trial? This distinction is illustrated starkly by 
contrasting the Canadian CCRG with the Scottish SCCRC: 50% of 
the latter’s referrals were referred not because of new evidence 
emerging, but because of a procedural error.157 
While there may be political considerations that play into 
restricting the ambit of a post-conviction review body to fresh 
evidence cases, there are two principled arguments for preferring 
the SCCRC’s approach. The first is that procedural errors, while 
they cannot provide the proof of factual innocence required by the 
NCIIC, can certainly cast doubt over the guilt of the person 
concerned.158 If, for example, the case against the applicant was 
based primarily on a confession obtained without the suspect being 
offered legal assistance and there exists little else by way of 
evidence, then the applicant’s guilt is no longer as clear as it was.159 
Likewise, if the jury was not given a clear instruction about how to 
evaluate identification evidence against the accused in a case 
where the identification evidence was weak, this too casts some 
doubt on the issue of guilt.160 
The second reason, however, is unrelated to guilt. Permitting 
a conviction to stand where there is convincing evidence of guilt 
but there has been a serious error of procedure would arguably 
harm the integrity of the criminal justice process.161 Integrity and 
legitimacy are both important if the criminal justice system is to 
 
 157. The English CCRC, where the test for referral is broadly similar to that of the 
SCCRC, also refers a considerable number of cases on “procedural” grounds. See ELKS, 
supra note 13, at 186–90 (reviewing homicide referrals). 
 158. Roberts & Weathered, supra note 125, at 55; Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty 
Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 324 (2010). 
 159. See, e.g., M. v. H.M. Advocate [2012] HCJAC 157, at ¶¶ 10, 12 (exemplifying a case 
referred by the SCCRC where a case was solely based on an applicant’s confession obtained 
without legal assistance). 
 160. See, e.g., Docherty v. H.M. Advocate [2014] HCJAC 94, at ¶ 24 (exemplifying a case 
referred by the SCCRC where the jury instruction lacked instruction to aptly evaluate 
identification evidence). On the importance of jury instructions concerning eyewitness 
identification evidence, see Leverick, supra note 6, at 555–56. 
 161. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 14, at 1185 (arguing that convictions based on 
procedural errors are “tremendously significant and legitimate”); BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF 
JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES 2–3 (2004). 
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retain its moral authority to punish and for the public to retain 
confidence in the system.162 As Spencer puts it: 
the criminal appeal process exists not only to ensure that the 
factually innocent are not punished, but also to uphold the rule 
of law. . . . [A] criminal conviction is only acceptable if it carries 
moral authority, and a decision reached in defiance of the basic 
rules that society prescribes for criminal investigations and 
criminal trials does not.163 
It is not our intention here to enter the debate about whether 
a conviction should ever be quashed on the basis of a procedural 
irregularity where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.164 
There is certainly a case to be made for the courts to be able to 
quash the conviction of a factually guilty person where the 
procedural irregularity that took place was so serious it calls the 
integrity of the criminal justice system into question.165 But it does 
not necessarily follow that it should be the role of a post-conviction 
review body to do so. 
On one hand, Weeden (a former English CCRC Commissioner) 
has argued that there is a role for the English CCRC in protecting 
“the general integrity of the criminal justice system.”166 According 
to Weeden, the English CCRC 
works to overturn not only the wrongful convictions of those 
who others believe to be innocent, but also the wrongful 
convictions of those who only may be innocent (though others 
doubt it) and even, indeed, of those who, though they seem 
clearly guilty, have been convicted only after substantial 
systemic error or wrongdoing.167 
By contrast, in Cochrane, the SCCRC took the stance that it is 
not appropriate for a post-conviction review body to refer a case 
 
 162. Quirk, supra note 125, at 761. See generally IAN H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
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where a procedural error makes no difference to the strength of the 
evidence against the applicant.168  Cochrane had applied to the 
SCCRC claiming that the indictment on which he was convicted 
was invalid as the facts specified did not constitute a crime.169 The 
SCCRC agreed, but declined to refer the case. Relying on the 
second limb of its test for referral,170 the Commission argued that 
it was not in the interests of justice, given the overwhelming 
evidence that Cochrane had been involved in a criminal 
conspiracy. Cochrane responded by petitioning the nobile officium, 
an equitable remedy of last resort in Scotland where no other legal 
options are available. His case was unsuccessful on a technicality, 
although the court stated that it would also have refused the case 
on its merits.171 More significant is the explanation of Peter Duff, 
one of the commissioners involved in the case, who provided a more 
significant explanation as to why the decision was taken to reject 
it: 
First, the Commission’s primary function is to prevent factually 
innocent people from being punished for offences they had not 
committed. This was not such a case. Second, an important task 
of the Commission is to foster confidence in the Scottish 
criminal justice system and this would not be accomplished by 
referring, on a pure technicality, the case of someone who was 
clearly guilty.172 
 
 168. Cochrane v. H.M. Advocate [2002] S.L.T. 1424, at ¶¶ 18–19 (original appeal against 
conviction); Cochrane (Petitioner) [2006] HCJAC 27, at ¶ 9 (petition to the nobile officium). 
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The case might be distinguished from Cochrane, though, in that the error was one that 
related to the evidence available at the original trial. It was not, in the words of Duff, a 
“pure technicality.” Straddling Two Worlds, supra note 13, at 707. 
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It is argued here that the approach taken in Cochrane is the 
correct one. While it is undoubtedly true that an important role of 
a post-conviction review body is to foster public confidence in the 
criminal justice system, this is not going to be achieved by the 
referral of cases where there is overwhelming evidence of the 
applicant’s guilt.173 A Commission, or other post-conviction review 
body, sits outside the court system and acts as a body of last resort. 
It plays a role in fostering public confidence and in upholding 
integrity in the narrow sense of minimizing the extent to which the 
system makes mistakes. It does not, however, bear the 
responsibility of securing the integrity of the criminal justice 
system where to do so would mean the release into society of a 
probably guilty (and possibly dangerous) person.174 It might be said 
in response that integrity, in the broad sense, can be upheld 
without necessarily releasing the person concerned. A referral 
could result in the conviction being quashed, but a retrial 
(untainted by the original breach) being ordered.175 But this will 
not always be possible or appropriate. The breach might have 
occurred prior to trial (in which case a fresh trial can hardly be 
said to “cure” it)176 or the passage of time or other factors may make 
retrial impossible.177 But all practical considerations aside, the 
principle argument playing in favor of a court quashing the 
conviction of a guilty person where there has been a serious 
procedural impropriety—that it has lost the moral authority to 
convict—simply does not apply to a post-conviction review body. A 
post-conviction review body sits outside the court system. It does 
not lose moral authority in the same way and by referring such 
cases runs the risk of serious damage to public support for and 
confidence in the institution.178 
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D. The Cases Eligible for Review 
A further question is the scope of a post-conviction review body 
in terms of whether it considers cases regardless of their 
seriousness or whether restrictions are placed on its remit.179 
There are no formal limits on the types of cases that can be 
reviewed by the SCCRC or the Canadian CCRG,180 although in 
practice the CCRG has referred only cases on indictment (mostly 
murder and sexual assault)181 whereas the SCCRC’s referrals have 
included summary cases and covered a broader range of offense 
categories.182 The NCIIC is formally restricted to considering 
applications from those who have been convicted of a felony. 
There is a strong argument in favor of permitting a post-
conviction review body to consider all types of cases, regardless of 
their seriousness. Mistakes in summary cases are not necessarily 
of less impact—conviction for any criminal offense carries with it 
considerable stigma: it is the “the strongest formal censure that 
society can inflict.”183 As Hamer puts it: 
For one defendant a first summary conviction may be extremely 
damaging to career, family and relationships, whereas for 
another, already in prison on other unchallenged convictions, 
an additional indictable conviction may make little 
difference.184 
Having said that, while there is no principled reason for 
restricting the ambit of a post-conviction review body, where 
limited resources are available priorities have to be placed 
somewhere. Both the Scottish SCCRC and the English CCRC have 
been permitted to investigate summary and indictable cases from 
 
 179. There is also the question of whether a post-conviction review body should consider 
claims relating solely to sentence, but this lies outside the scope of our Article. 
 180. Initially the CCRG could only review cases originally prosecuted on indictment, but 
the 2002 amendments to the Criminal Code allow those convicted of summary offenses to 
request conviction review. 
 181. See CAMPBELL (forthcoming 2018), supra note 44, at 400, 400 n.32 (questioning the 
discretion of “the Attorney General to send a case directly to trial” by way of indictment). 
 182. See Conviction, supra note 95 (listing of referred conviction cases). 
 183. ASHWORTH & HORDER, supra note 145, at 1. On the effect of a criminal conviction 
on subsequent employment prospects, see Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, 
Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma Reports Among Expungement-
Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016). 
 184. Hamer, supra note 11, at 309. 
74 Stetson Law Review [Vol. 47 
the outset.185 However, it is notable that, in the face of “serious 
funding constraints,” the UK Parliament’s House of Commons 
Justice Committee recommended in 2015 that the English CCRC 
be given a statutory discretion to refuse to investigate cases dealt 
with summarily.186 Politics also come into play here. When a post-
conviction review body is first being contemplated, there may be 
something to be said for giving it a narrow scope because this is 
more politically palatable.187 
There is also the question of whether a post-conviction review 
body should be able to investigate cases where the convicted person 
is dead and the application is made by other interested parties 
such as his or her relatives. This would be ruled out in North 
Carolina, but it is possible in Scotland and Canada. While no 
Scottish referrals have been made in such cases to date,188 in 
Canada the CCRG has begun (but not completed) a conviction 
review on the case of Wilbert Coffin.189 There are two possible 
arguments in favor of permitting this. The first is that the impact 
of a wrongful conviction can be considerable for the family of a 
wrongly convicted person.190 Although not as directly stigmatizing 
as being physically incarcerated or directly impacting 
employment, the indirect stigma and lingering effects on family 
members of the wrongly convicted persists after the conviction and 
death of the person concerned.191 Extending the remit to cases 
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where the convicted person is dead can, however, raises difficult 
issues. As a former chair of the English CCRC noted,192 the 
investigation might reveal evidence against another family 
member193 or other information that is embarrassing to the 
family.194 It may also be the case that family members disagree 
about whether an application should be made. 
The second argument is that there may be a wider public 
interest in acknowledging and correcting mistakes made by the 
justice system, as the Court of Appeal accepted in the case of James 
Hanratty,195 referred by the English CCRC after his death. But 
Hanratty was a notorious case: the public interest is less clear if 
the case has long since faded from the public memory.196 The public 
interest argument is also weaker when the case is not one where 
the factual innocence of the defendant is clear, for example where 
the basis for the reference is that the defendant should have been 
convicted of a lesser charge, rather than not convicted at all.197 The 
existence of difficulties such as those referred to above are not in 
themselves sufficient reason as a matter of principle to exclude 
cases involving deceased applicants from a post-conviction review 
body’s remit.198 They do, however, add weight to the argument that 
if there are scarce resources, the resources may be better directed 
at exonerating those still imprisoned or living under the stigma of 
a wrongful conviction, rather than focusing on cases involving the 
deceased. 
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E. A Role in Systemic Reform? 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the role of a post-
conviction review body in relation to individual cases. However, it 
has been suggested that such a body should play a wider role in 
terms of lobbying for systemic reform.199 Neither the CCRG, 
SCCRC, nor NCIIC have played a substantial role in law reform to 
date. In North Carolina, there exists a separate body with a remit 
to make recommendations for systemic reform, the North Carolina 
Actual Innocence Commission,200 although the NCIIC does cite 
some examples where its search for missing evidence has led to the 
identification and rectification of systematic flaws.201 In Scotland, 
there is no standing body charged specifically with making 
recommendations about the prevention of wrongful conviction, 
although such recommendations have been made in the context of 
specific enquiries.202 The SCCRC has occasionally contributed to 
policy debates, but only to those that have a direct impact on its 
operations.203 In Canada, there is also no permanent body charged 
with making systemic reform recommendations, but there have 
been seven major ad hoc enquiries into the causes of wrongful 
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conviction in specific cases,204 as well as two broad reviews,205 all of 
which have made recommendations for reform. 
It was never envisaged that any of the CCRG, SCCRC, or 
NCIIC would have a systemic reform role,206 but such a role was 
envisaged for the English CCRC by the Royal Commission report 
that led to its introduction. While the Royal Commission was clear 
that the “primary function” of the English CCRC should be to 
consider and investigate individual cases,207 it recommended that 
it “should also be able to draw attention in its report to general 
features of the criminal justice system which it had found 
unsatisfactory in the course of its work, and to make any 
recommendations for change it thinks fit.”208 In reality, the English 
CCRC has done very little in this respect,209 primarily due to 
limited resources.210 Nevertheless, a 2015 parliamentary enquiry 
recommended that resources be injected to rectify the situation.211 
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Resources aside, is it a good idea as a matter of principle for a 
post-conviction review body to play a role in systemic reform? 
Working to improve the safeguards against a wrongful conviction 
in a particular jurisdiction is certainly important, and a body 
charged with reviewing individual cases might be seen as well 
placed to develop an understanding of the factors contributing to 
this.212 But the insights likely to be generated should not be 
overstated. All of the cases seen by a post-conviction review body 
are historic and some of them will stem from a considerable time 
ago. As such, the legal issues they raise may already be well known 
or addressed.213 
There are also other reasons why a post-conviction review 
body may not be the best to engage in systemic reform work. If 
such a body intervenes too readily in policy issues this might pose 
a threat to its impartiality that affects its relationship not only 
with the courts,214 but also with the police and prosecutors who 
might perceive the review body as biased towards the interests of 
the defense. It may also be the case, as Roach has argued,215 that 
the ideal membership of an error correction body is not the same 
as that of a body concerned with achieving systemic reform. Roach 
suggests that error correction requires at least some degree of legal 
expertise, as there is little or no point in referring cases that the 
appeals court will simply reject.216 Ensuring such groups have 
quasi-judicial membership may also be important to add 
legitimacy to the many rejected cases.217 
Systemic reform, on the other hand, is easier to achieve if 
there is broad-based membership from the range of bodies involved 
in the criminal justice system: police, prosecutors, defense 
representatives, and victim groups.218 Politically, systemic reform 
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helps build consensus to see the proposals through in practice.219 
However, Roach states that such broad-based membership is 
inappropriate for error correction as it opens up the possibility of 
real or perceived conflicts of interest.220 For rejected applicants in 
particular it is important that the body is seen as genuinely 
independent and not partisan towards police, prosecutors, crime 
victims, or even the judiciary.221 This is, perhaps, a little 
overstated. 
Some reform exercises have certainly stalled due to a failure 
to build political consensus,222 but this does not necessarily mean 
that a reform group must itself always have broad-based 
membership. There are plenty of examples of reform projects 
undertaken by narrowly constituted groups that have successfully 
achieved change.223 Likewise, there are also examples of bodies 
charged with individual conviction review that have broad-based 
membership and are generally perceived as successful. The 
SCCRC, for example, has had an ex-police officer as a 
commissioner without this posing any obvious threat to its 
relationship with the courts or its perception as an independent 
institution.224 The present chair of the English CCRC is a former 
Chief Executive of the Crown Prosecution Service and while there 
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was some disquiet surrounding his initial appointment,225 there is 
no suggestion that this has caused any ongoing difficulties.226 
On the other hand, a body concerned primarily with the review 
of individual applications is perhaps not ideally situated to keep 
the entire system under review. Roach is correct to suggest that 
this is better achieved at one step removed, by a body or advisory 
panel affiliated to a post-conviction review body.227 Such a body 
could advocate for change without undermining the error 
correction work undertaken by its sister organization.228 This 
approach is an attractive one, although given that a post-
conviction review body may come across systemic problems in the 
course of its review of individual cases,229 it would make sense for 
the two bodies to work side by side and inform each other’s 
operations. In taking precisely this approach, despite its other 
flaws, there is much to be said for the system implemented in 
North Carolina. 
It is also important, though, that whatever approach is taken 
there is some mechanism for monitoring the extent to which any 
recommendations made are put into practice. Much is already 
known about the causes of wrongful conviction230 and none of the 
three jurisdictions examined here are immune from criticism in 
terms of practices in which they continue to engage in that have 
been shown to increase the risk of wrongful convictions occurring, 
despite recommendations having been made to the contrary.231 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Post-conviction review is a necessary part of the criminal 
justice system when it is faced with wrongful convictions. The DNA 
revolution of the previous three decades has clearly demonstrated 
that the police, prosecutors, juries, and judges sometimes get it 
wrong; the National Registry of Exonerations, for example, lists 
1,729 known exonerations of convicted persons across the U.S., 
many of which have been exonerated years (or even decades) after 
the original proceedings concluded.232 These numbers alone 
underscore the importance of having some sort of process, 
operating outside of the regular court system, to address such 
miscarriages of justice. While one option might simply be to permit 
out-of-time appeals where fresh evidence of innocence emerges, as 
has been done in South Australia, this neglects the need for a body 
with the power and resources to uncover such evidence in the first 
place. 
Establishing that there is a need for some form of post-
conviction review body is, however, only the starting point. The 
three post-conviction review schemes examined in this Article 
differ in a number of important respects and comparing these 
different approaches has allowed us to draw several conclusions 
about the proper role of such bodies. The first is that independence 
from government is fundamental—ideally outright independence, 
but if not, then certainly some form of externality. While actual 
bias has not been demonstrated at the CCRG (which is in effect a 
government body amongst the three schemes discussed), the 
perception of independence is particularly important. The absence 
of independence, as it is suggested here, is a real barrier to justice 
in the Canadian context, and may account for the very low 
numbers of applications for review compared to those at the 
independent SCCRC and NCIIC. To be effective, it is also 
important that a post-conviction review body is sufficiently 
resourced, so that it can undertake its own independent 
investigations, and has wide powers to compel evidence. All three 
of the post-conviction review schemes examined here have the 
resources to investigate claims and also have considerable powers 
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to obtain evidence. This is an important strength of the system in 
all three jurisdictions and serves to counter—at least in part—the 
disadvantage the wrongly convicted person faces in terms of 
having the time, money, and legal powers needed to challenge a 
wrongful conviction. 
The second conclusion is that restricting the ambit of a post-
conviction review body to cases in which fresh evidence of 
innocence emerges is to unjustly narrow its ambit. The three 
schemes examined here operate under different tests for referral, 
which in turn affect their respective referral rates (0.64% at the 
NCIIC; 4.5% at the SCCRC; 5.8% for the CCRG). The narrowest is 
that of the NCIIC, which requires proof of actual innocence and 
excludes cases in which the applicant lacked mens rea, had a 
justification defense, or should have been convicted of a lesser 
offense. Unsurprisingly it refers only 0.64% of the applications it 
receives. It is not difficult to see that such narrow criteria are a 
cause of injustice, although they may have been necessary to 
achieve the political consensus to establish the scheme at all. The 
CCRG’s test for referral is wider, but is still limited to cases in 
which fresh evidence emerges, a limitation we argue is also unjust, 
given that procedural irregularities can themselves cast doubt on 
the safety of a conviction. The SCCRC can refer cases where there 
has been a procedural irregularity—such as a trial judge 
misdirection about the definition of the crime or the manner in 
which the evidence should be evaluated—and it is right that it is 
able to do so. This should not, however, extend to the referral of 
cases where the procedural error casts no doubt on the safety of 
the conviction. It is not, we argue, the proper role of a post-
conviction review body to uphold the integrity of the criminal 
courts. Such a body sits outside the court system and its concern 
should be with factual innocence—procedural errors are relevant 
only to the extent that they suggest an applicant might have been 
wrongly convicted. 
It also has to be said that the test for referral cannot be 
considered entirely in isolation. In referring cases, all three of the 
schemes are bound by what the courts will accept as evidence of 
innocence. While the referral rate for each of the schemes is 
relatively low, the “success rates” for the cases actually referred to 
the courts following review are much higher. The NCIIC and 
CCRG have a success rate of over 90%, which is perhaps not 
surprising given the stringent tests that cases must satisfy to be 
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referred by these two bodies (indeed the test applied by the CCRG 
is more difficult to satisfy than that for the subsequent appeal 
against conviction). The SCCRC’s success rate is lower, at 48%, but 
aside from one referral from the early days of its operation,233 there 
is no evidence that it is doing anything other than attempting to 
apply the same test as the court would in determining the 
appeal.234 It is just that the wider basis on which it can make 
referrals means that it is harder to predict the attitude the courts 
will take towards a case. All of this, however, raises much broader 
questions about whether the system of appeals against conviction 
is expansive enough to provide justice to all those who deserve it 
or whether some of the strict rules governing, for example, the 
admissibility of fresh evidence, ought to be relaxed.235 
The third conclusion is that the harm of wrongful conviction is 
not limited to those who are currently incarcerated, those who 
have committed serious offenses, or even those who are no longer 
living. Wrongful conviction for even a minor offense can have a 
seriously stigmatizing effect on one’s life and on the integrity of the 
criminal justice system. It can continue to blight the lives of 
relatives of a wrongfully convicted person even after his or her 
death. There is a principled case to be made for these errors to be 
within the remit of a post-conviction review body too, although 
practical considerations of cost and the scarce use of limited 
resources may mean that this is not always achievable. 
Finally, the fourth conclusion drawn is that while these 
schemes have a specific mandate to investigate wrongful 
convictions, they may not be best placed to engage in systemic 
reform work. Post-conviction exoneration, while onerous and 
limited, serves an important function for addressing wrongful 
convictions. This is not to neglect the parallel need to identify and 
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implement reforms within the criminal justice system to minimize 
the potential for wrongful convictions to occur in the first place.236 
The causes of wrongful conviction are well known, but there is still 
work to be done in all three of the jurisdictions examined here to 
“bullet proof” the system to guard against these. This work, while 
it would benefit from being informed by the work of a post-
conviction review body, may be better suited to a separate 
institution with a broader based membership. 
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